The Value of Human Life: A Philosophical Debate
Philosophy professor David Boonin argues that a human fetus is a human being at an early stage of development, but this does not necessarily mean it has the same right to life as a fully developed human. According to Boonin, being human is not enough to ground a right to life; intrinsic value is an accidental property acquired later in pregnancy.
Acquiring Intrinsic Value
Boonin claims that a fetus acquires intrinsic value when it develops organized cortical brain activity, capable of supporting present desires. This typically occurs between 25 and 32 weeks after conception. Prior to this point, the fetus lacks present desires and therefore has no right to life. However, this argument raises several questions and concerns.
Challenging Boonin’s Argument
Why should having immediately exercisable desires be value-giving rather than having a human nature that gives rise to desires? Consider the contrast between human embryos and amoebas. Neither has organized cortical brain activity, but human embryos will eventually develop rationality if not blocked by disease or injury. This suggests that human rights are grounded in being human, not behaving human.
Counterexamples and Implications
Boonin’s argument disqualifies newborns, who lack present desires due to their age. It also undermines human equality, as present and immediately exercisable desires vary from person to person. Furthermore, the argument is subject to counterexamples, such as an indoctrinated slave who lacks desire for freedom. If we justify enslaving him, we borrow from the substance view espoused by pro-lifers, which grounds the right to life in having a particular nature.
Alternative Perspectives
Francis J. Beckwith offers a thought experiment: suppose a scientist surgically alters a developing fetus’s brain so it can never desire anything. Five years later, the child is killed for its organs. Was the child harmed? If so, what’s doing the moral work is its nature, not its immediately exercisable desire for anything. Similarly, Buddhists and Stoics may not presently desire anything; do they forfeit their right to life?
Inalienable Rights
Accounts of human value based on desire conflict with the concept of inalienable rights. If your right to life is inalienable, you can’t dislodge it simply because you no longer desire to live. Inalienable rights can’t be negotiated away.
Conclusion
Boonin’s argument raises important questions about the nature of human value and the right to life. However, it is subject to various challenges and counterexamples. Alternative perspectives emphasize the importance of human nature and inalienable rights in grounding the right to life. Ultimately, the debate surrounding human value and the right to life remains a complex and contentious issue.
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